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Most East Timorese hoped that the long-awaited declaration of independence in 
May 2002 would mark a new beginning. Curiously, however, they continue to conjure 
up the spirits of the past. Over the last three years, the Dili press has published a host 
of articles reporting widely divergent views about the country's history, parliament has 
engaged in heated historical debates, and a Commission for Reception, Truth, and 
Reconciliation was established to research and report on the history of human rights 
violations. On the surface there is nothing terribly surprising about this. Following the 
August 1999 popular referendum, in which the population voted overwhelmingly to 
reject Indonesia's offer of broad autonomy, and the subsequent establishment of the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the people of 
East Timor could openly discuss their history for the first time. And there was much to 
discuss.
11 would like to thank Nugroho Katjasungkana and Abel dos Santos for comments on this paper, Cassia 
Bechara and Janet Gunter for help translating the Portuguese language quotations, and Jacinto Alves, 
Akihisa Matsuno, Coki Nasution, and Sahe Institute for Liberation for providing materials. Finally, I am 
tremendously grateful to my colleagues and students in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at the 
Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosae, without whom this article would not have been written. Students 
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The territory that is now East Timor fell within the Portuguese orbit in the early 
sixteenth century and remained under Portuguese control for the next four hundred 
years. During the Second World War, Portuguese Timor was invaded and brutally 
occupied by the Japanese. Following the war, the Portuguese reoccupied the colony, 
declared it an overseas province, and belatedly began to develop a modem 
bureaucracy, an educational system, and basic infrastructure. The overthrow of the 
Salazar-Caetano Estado Novo in April 1974 opened the way for decolonization at the 
furthest reaches of the Portuguese empire. But while Portuguese attention focused on 
domestic affairs, Indonesian intelligence agencies became increasingly involved in 
Timorese affairs, leading first to a coup d'etat by the Timorese Democratic Union 
(Uniao Democratica Timorense, UDT), then a counterattack by the Revolutionary 
Front of an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionario do Timor Leste 
Independente, Fretilin) and a brief period of political violence, and finally to the 
Indonesian invasion of Dili on December 7, 1975. Over the next twenty-four years, the 
Indonesian military conducted a horrific military onslaught and brutal occupation of 
what legally remained Portuguese Timor. Despite internal ruptures and continued 
Indonesian military campaigns, the resistance survived and even broadened. Although 
never powerful enough to expel the occupying forces, the resistance was sufficient to 
hold out until political change in Jakarta, coupled with international attention, would 
make possible a double decolonization.
Remarkably, historical debates in East Timor's parliament and press have focused 
almost exclusively on the events of 1975: the August coup and counter-coup, the 
formation of the Fretilin's National Liberation Army of East Timor (Formas Armadas 
de Libertagao Nacional de Timor Leste, abbreviated Falintil), the three-week period of 
violent conflict between the nascent political parties, covert Indonesian military 
operations in October and November, and, finally, Fretilin's declaration of 
independence on November 28, 1975. "The tradition of all the dead generations," 
Marx wrote, "weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living." For East Timorese, 
however, it would seem that the nightmare on the brain of the living is largely limited to 
a single generation—half of which perished during the late 1970s and the other half of 
which remains to help build a new future. Marx continues:
And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in 
creating something entirely new, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis 
they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from 
them names, battle slogans and costumes in order to present the new scene of 
world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language.2
Despite the extremely narrow scope of current historical debates in East Timor, 
opinions about 1975 reflect a more general view of history—be it Portuguese 
colonialism, Timorese kingdoms, the heyday of the coffee economy, the aborted 
process of decolonization, or the dark days of the Indonesian occupation—in which 
the classical metaphor of masters and slaves is central. This raises the obvious 
question: How did slavery, "the root metaphor of Western political philosophy, 
connoting everything that was evil about power relations," become entrenched in East
2 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. 
Tucker (New York/London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1978, second edition), p. 595.
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Timorese political thinking?3 This essay will trace the curious permutations of the 
master-slave metaphor in East Timorese political thinking about the past and suggest 
some of the implications this may have for politics in the newly independent East 
Timor.
Portuguese Masters and Timorese Slaves
Today, East Timorese universally agree that the East Timorese nation was 
colonized by Portugal for 450 years. This view is found in the few Indonesian language 
history books, is cited in the press, and is repeated by students throughout the country. 
The nation's colonial history is generally conceived in terms of the classical metaphor 
of masters and slaves: Portuguese "masters" colonized and exploited East Timorese 
"slaves," and these "slaves" responded by struggling for freedom with the objective of 
becoming "masters" of their own destiny. In the words of Xanana Gusmao, "The 
people of East Timor were oppressed by Portuguese colonialism for 450 years, a 
century longer than the Dutch colonization of Indonesia."4 Elsewhere he writes that the 
East Timorese were "enslaved by Portugal and kept in complete underdevelopment for 
centuries. . . . "5 Although it is not surprising, there are three problematic features of 
this view.
First, in stating that they were colonized for 450 years, East Timorese ignore certain 
facts: that the first permanent Portuguese settlement on Timor was not established 
until the 1640s, when a Dominican friar began the construction of a fort at Kupang; 
that the Solor and Timor islands did not become part of the Portuguese Estado da India 
until 1681; that the first Portuguese governor based on Timor was not appointed until 
1702; that Dominican friars expelled the Portuguese governor from Timor in 1721 and 
again in 1742; and that the capital was only moved from Lifau (Oecussi) to Dili in 
1769. Furthermore, between 1769 and the mid-nineteenth century Portuguese control 
was limited to the tiny settlements of Dili, Manatuto, Laleia, Vemasse and a few other 
points on the northern littoral. Serious efforts to establish direct control over the 
interior did not begin until the mid-nineteenth century and were not completed until the 
end of the Manufahi war in 1913. In sum, Portuguese naval dominance dates from the 
early sixteenth century and commercial dominance from the late eighteenth century, but 
the establishment of clear administrative divisions, the appointment of administrators, 
and the creation of a bureaucratic apparatus did not occur until the early twentieth 
century.
The second feature of this view concerns the notion of exploitation. According to 
East Timorese, Portuguese "colonialism" was driven by the search for spices and the 
desire to spread the Catholic faith. This idea originates from the famous statement 
attributed to Vasco da Gama on his arrival in India at the end of the fifteenth century 
that he had come in search of "Christians and spices."6 Today, East Timorese consider
3 Susan Buck-Morss, "Hegel and Haiti," Critical Inquiry, no. 26 (Summer 2000), pp. 821-865.
4 Xanana Gusmao, essay written on the 70*^ birthday of H. J. C. Princen, in To Resist is to Win: The 
Autobiography of Xanana Gusmao, ed. Sarah Niner (Richmond, Victoria: Aurora Books, 2000), p. 208.
5 Xanana Gusmao, "A History," in To Resist is to Win, p. 103.
6 C[harles]. R. Boxer, Four Centuries o f Portuguese Expansion, 1415-1825: A Succint Survey 0ohannesburg: 
Witwatersrand University Press, 1968), him. 13.
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economic goals to have been primary, with proselytization and the civilizing mission 
understood as a means to achieve them. But the profits of the famous sandalwood 
trade generally accrued to the city of Macau, not the Portuguese monarchy, and despite 
some early successes, Catholic proselytization on Timor stalled for the greater part of 
three centuries.
Third, this view is commonly predicated on the assumption that the East Timorese 
nation has always existed. This is not unique to East Timor: most nationalist 
movements have claimed their nation to be eternal. The most remarkable example of 
this view is found in a message titled, "A history that beats in the Maubere soul," 
written by Xanana Gusmao, who assumed leadership of Falintil in 1981; the message 
was written for East Timorese youth in 1986. The argument pivots around the master- 
slave metaphor. Against the "false history" that "speaks of the people of Timor as 
'obedient and faithful' and loyal to Portugal" and the "perpetual colonial slavery" 
imposed by the "military expansionists from Jakarta," Gusmao asserts that 
"participation in the struggle for national liberation is a moral duty, and above all it is 
a political and historical obligation," an obligation accepted so that Timor can become 
"master of its own destiny and the Maubere People free themselves from the eternal 
chains of colonial slavery . . . ,"7 But then Gusmao's argument takes an unexpected 
twist:
The historical identity of East Timor dates back to long before the arrival of the 
Portuguese. If it had not been for the intrusion of Portuguese colonialism, the 
people of East Timor would have followed their own path; they would have 
created a socio-political structure defined by the essence of one people and one 
nation. With the arrival of the colonists, this march was halted because the 
necessity of exploring [sic; exploiting] our wealth caused a war of pacification 
that put a stop to the struggles between the diverse kingdoms, each one wanting 
to take a position of ascendancy and domination over the others. The 
ascendancy of one of these tribes would have determined the formation of a great 
kingdom—the embryo of the Maubere Homeland!8
But Gusmao's own struggle demonstrates that a glorious past is not a precondition 
for nationhood. So why conjure up the spirits of an imaginary past? The answer may 
lie in the problematic history of Timor. Benedict Anderson has highlighted the curious 
tendency of many nationalist movements to claim ancient, even eternal, roots. More 
recently, he has suggested that for early nationalists in the Philippines, where there 
were no centralized and literate states, "folklore substituted for Ancient Grandeur."9 
For East Timorese, appeals to a glorious past are doubly complicated: not only are 
there no court records or chronicles, but the most important center of pre-colonial 
power, Wehale, lies in what today is Indonesian West Timor.10 Unable to appeal to
7 Quotations from Gusmao, "A History," pp. 92, 89, 86,124.
8 Xanana Gusmao, "A History that Beats in the Maubere Soul," dated May 20,1986, in To Resist is to Win, 
p. 103.
9 See Benedict Anderson, "The Rooster's Egg: Pioneering World Folklore in the Philippines," New Left 
Review (March-April 2000): 47-62.
10 On Wehale, see Gerzon Tom Therik, "Wehali: The Four Comer Land: The Cosmology and Traditions of a 
Timorese Ritual Centre" (PhD dissertation, The Australian National University, 1995).
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"Ancient Grandeur," and lacking access to "scientific" folklore, Gusmao conjures up 
an imagined alternative: the greatness that would have been if not for colonial 
domination.
Despite the prominence of the master-slave metaphor in East Timorese nationalist 
discourse, East Timorese are silent on real slavery. Yet Portuguese interest in Timor 
was also driven by the slave trade. Writing on the sandalwood trade in the sixteenth 
century, the Portuguese historian de Carvalho Branco notes that "[l]ike the Moors of 
Macasse [Macassar], in addition to sandalwood they [Portuguese merchants based in 
Malacca] also collected slaves in the ports of Manatulo [Manatuto] and Aden."11 In 
the sixteenth century, slaves were obtained from Lomblen, Alor, Roti, Wetar, Kisar, 
and Timor, and the Portuguese settlement on Solor, and later at Larantuca on Flores, 
which was the "key marketplace for the archipelago-wide trade in slaves."12 During the 
seventeenth century, according to Charles Boxer, "slaves for the Batavia and Macao 
markets were the next most profitable commodity" after sandalwood.13
There were several reasons for the prominence of slavery "at the end of the world," 
as the Solor-Timor region was called. Portuguese captains sought to remedy the 
enormous loss of human life suffered on the outward bound voyages from Portugal to 
Asia through slavery. With a maritime empire stretching from Lisbon to Pernambuco 
and from the Algarve to Timor, the Portuguese also had limited capacity to ship bulky 
commodities such as sandalwood from Timor. Furthermore, while the Portuguese 
sandalwood trade was carried out on a seasonal basis and limited to a ship or two per 
year, the sale of slaves within the archipelago could proceed year round. The Dutch 
East India Company's ban on the enslavement of Javanese also meant that slaves were 
sought further east, most commonly from Sulawesi, Bali, Buton, and, of course, 
Timor.14
Slaves were procured by a variety of means. Both Portuguese and Dutch ships 
engaged in slave raids. More commonly, however, the Topasses (or Black Portuguese15) 
of Larantuca conducted slave raids throughout the Solor-Timor region and then sold 
their chattel to the Portuguese and Dutch, as well as to Chinese merchants.16 17Local 
rulers on Timor were also active participants in this trade—selling not only slaves 
captured in war but also their own subjects. Slaves were a prominent feature of the 
early Portuguese settlements on Timor during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 
1770, one year after the capital was moved from Lifau, there were reportedly 375 
slaves in Dili out of a total population of 750.17 Furthermore, it appears that the 
institution of slavery was one of the primary vehicles by which Catholicism was 
spread in Portuguese Timor. In 1856, for example, slaves constituted one-third of the
11 Joao Diogo Alarcao de Carvalho Branco, "A Ordem de S. Domingos e as Origens de Timor," trans. Janet 
Gunter, Independencia 5 (1987): 37.
12 Geoffrey C. Gunn, Timor Loro Sae: 500 Years (Macau: Livros do Oriente, 1999), p. 64.
13 Charles Boxer, Fidalgos of the Far East, 1550-1770 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 189.
14 C[harles]. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800 (London: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 269-270.
15 The Dutch referred to the mestizo community of Portuguese speakers in the Solor and Timor region as 
"Black Portuguese."
16 Boxer, Fidalgos, p. 189.
17 Geoffrey Gunn, Timor Loro Sae: 500 Years, p. 113.
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Catholic population of Dili.18And in 1861, the Governor of Timor was sufficiently 
concerned about rebellions to call on the Capitao Cina to "arm all Chinese, their 
children and their slaves."19
Given the prominence of the master-slave metaphor, one would expect East 
Timorese to mention the second most important trade commodity from the Solor and 
Timor islands during at least the first two centuries of the Portuguese presence as part 
of the national history. But they do not.
Liurai and Atari
The reason East Timorese avoid any mention of real slavery is not simply the lack 
of historical information or inability to access historical materials in foreign languages. 
Instead, this silence on actually existing slavery reflects the legacy of Timorese social 
stratification. There was certainly considerable variation across the island, but in 
general pre-colonial societies on Timor were divided into three classes: chiefs and 
nobles (liurai and dato), commoners (emar, later reino), and slaves (atari).20 According to 
the Portuguese poet and ethnographer of Timor, Ruy Cinatti:
At the bottom of society lived the slaves, prisoners of war (lutuhum), or 
people bought (ata). Slavery, not very rigid, often permitted serfs to become free 
men. Osorio de Castro wrote: "I dare say that among the Timorese there is an 
adoption, perhaps more in disguise at present to the eyes of the Portuguese 
authorities, of slavery. In olden times, wars between kingdoms or even villages 
furnished slaves from the vanquished peoples. It was called, and is still called, 
lutuhum 'the ones inside the fence' (from hitu meaning "to pay," and hum 
meaning fence), valued at five buffalos for a child slave, or creature, as they were 
called, and one or two buffalos for an adult slave." That was the organic 
structure of Timorese society at the beginning of the twentieth century.. . .
[With] the prohibition and persecution of slavery, the lutuhum class totally 
disappeared, aside from one or two sporadic cases. Still today the language 
continues to reflect former times, when the Timorese insulted themselves by 
calling one another "son of a slave," a treatment that was considered to be 
profoundly offensive to remind one of a shameful ancestry.21
18 In 1856 the Christian population of Dili was 1,491, of which 556 were Christian slaves. The total 
population of Dili was 3,017. Gregorio Maria Barreto, "Timor," Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, Serie 1, 
Parte nao official, 1858, pp. 478-481, cited in Rene Pelissier, Timor en Guerre: Le Crocodile et Les Portugais 
(1847-1913) (Orgeval, France: 1996), pp. 37-38.
19 Gunn, Timor Lorosae, p. 162.
20 According to John Villiers, "a more or less clearly defined social structure of village chiefs and nobility, 
commoners and slaves obtained in most of the islands of the Solor group.. . John Villiers, "As Derradeiras 
do Mundo: The Dominican Missions and the Sandalwood Trade in the Lesser Sunda Islands in the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in II Semindrio Internacional de Historia lndo-Portuguesa (Lisboa: 
Institute de Investigagao Cientffica Tropical, 1985), p. 576. West Timorese social stratification is discussed 
in A. D. M. Parera, Sejarah Pemerintahan Raja-Raja Timor: Suatu Kajian Peta Politik Pemerintahan Kerajaan- 
Kerajaan Di Timor Sebelum Kemerdekaan Rl, ed. Gregor Neonbasu (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994), 
esp. pp. 76-82. Social classes in pre-colonial eastern Timor and Portuguese Timor are discussed in Geoffrey 
Gunn, Timor Loro Sae: 500 Years, pp. 31-50.
21 Ruy Cinatti, Arquitectura Timorense, ed. Leopoldo de Almeida and Sousa Mendes (Lisboa: Institute de 
Investigagao Cientffica Tropical, Museu de Etnologia, 1987), p. 31. The possibility of slaves being freed is
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But indigenous social structure was also fundamentally reshaped by the slow 
expansion of Portuguese colonialism. During the eighteenth century, the Portuguese 
granted military titles to members of the indigenous elite, and during the nineteenth 
century waged a series of brutal military campaigns to subordinate rebellious chiefs to 
the colonial administration. This transformation was the central theme of a pioneering 
Marxist history of Portuguese Timor written in 1975 by Abilio de Araujo, himself the 
son of a liurai.22 In another work titled "Timorese Elites," Araujo argued that 
Portuguese colonial rule had
. . .  succeeded because [it] had the support of the liurais who in the meantime rose 
within the colonial order to the rank of major and lieutenant colonel of the second 
rank! This first elite was basically made up of liurais and datos who little by little 
submitted to the colonial yoke.
This elite did not lose anything when it made a pact with colonialism. On the 
contrary, in addition to the powers which the traditional society recognised or 
was forced to recognise—judicial, administrative, military, etc.—new powers 
were conferred on them by colonialism.23
Araujo thus extended the master-slave metaphor beyond that of colonizers and the 
colonized to highlight the parallel division in Timorese social structure between chiefs 
who collaborated with the colonial rulers and the "oppressed" population. But in 
doing so, he also collapsed the categories emar/reino (subjects) and atari (slaves), with 
the result that actually existing slavery disappeared from the analysis.
Despite the old tripartite division of society into chiefs, commoners, and slaves, 
Timorese today most commonly think of indigenous social structure in terms of the 
stark dichotomy between liurai and atari, chiefs and slaves. East Timorese are acutely 
aware who is a descendant of a legitimate traditional ruler, who is a descendant of a 
Portuguese-appointed chief, and who obtained positions by collaborating with the 
Indonesian occupiers. They also know who was a commoner and who was a slave. But 
most people are reluctant to discuss traditional social status in public. When I asked 
the seventy students taking my course on nationalism at the National University of 
East Timor if any were descended from liurai families, not a single student would 
answer. But when assigned to write essays on their family background and 
nationalism, a quarter of all students wrote that they were descended from liurai, and 
if we include those who said that they were descended from village heads (chefe de 
suco), hamlet heads (chefe aldeia), and traditional leaders (ketua adat), 40 percent of the 
class were from what might be classified as indigenous elites. By contrast, only three 
students stated that their ancestors were slaves (atari or budak), and none provided 
any details.
Several students descended from liurai families wrote that their ancestors had 
owned slaves. One student wrote: "My ancestors were feared because they liked to go 
to war and liked to buy and sell people. In that era they ruled over a large area, and
also discussed in H. O. Forbes, "On Some of the Tribes of the Island of Timor/' Journal of the Anthropological 
Institute o f Great Britain and Ireland, vol. 13 (1884): 417.
22 Abilio de Araujo, Timor Leste: Os Loricos Voltaram a Cantar (Lisbon: 1977).
23 Abilio de Araujo, "Timorese Elites," pamphlet, ed. Jill Jolliffe and Bob Reece (n.p. 1975), p. 3.
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they were the elite in the social structure, with the status of Dato."24 Another student 
described how his ancestors had given slaves to the Liurai of Vemasse in return for an 
official title and sacred objects.
In the past my ancestors received sacred objects from the Dato of Kelikai 
[Quelicai], who was directly under the supervision of the Liurai or Don of 
Vemasse. Each [sacred] object that was passed down to followers had to be 
reciprocated for by giving slaves to the chief, to symbolize that the sacred objects 
had been paid for with human beings. But because the people receiving the sacred 
objects loved their family and relatives, they looked for slaves to trade to the 
chief. The slaves were obtained from the people who lost in wars between 
different villages. The losers were captured and taken home by the winners of the 
war. My ancestors received a sacred object called Setmoko Isin Asin as a symbol 
that Waimane village was part of the area under the Liurai of Vemasse.25
Although rarely discussed, most East Timorese know such stories and can readily 
identify the descendants of chiefs and slaves alike. This awkward history is perhaps 
the most important reason why East Timorese today so readily cite the "fact" that 
they were colonized by Portuguese for 450 years: by focusing on colonial rule and 
exploitation—Portuguese masters and Timorese slaves—they can avoid the 
uncomfortable fact that East Timorese enslaved other East Timorese.
Sociedade and Asuliar
While East Timorese employ the master-slave metaphor when speaking of both 
indigenous social structure and colonial rule, there is an additional permutation of this 
theme specific to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Portuguese first 
began to establish a territory-wide colonial administration in the mid-nineteenth 
century. The depletion of sandalwood on Timor led to a concerted effort to develop 
coffee as an export product, first under Governor Afonso da Castro during the 1860s 
and then more vigorously under Governor Celestino da Silva between 1894 and 1908. 
The fundamental problem for the new plantation economy was not the availability of 
land, but the securing of a reliable and inexpensive supply of labor.
In 1875, the Kingdom of Portugal banned slavery in all areas subject to Portuguese 
civil law, including distant Timor. Although the trade in human beings ceased, slavery 
did not disappear from the Timorese landscape. In fact, the establishment of coffee 
plantations in Portuguese Timor was accompanied by widespread forced labor. Each 
kingdom was required to supply laborers for a specified number of days each month, 
with orders then passed down to village heads who were responsible for recruitment. 
In 1906, the colonial government established a head tax, ostensibly in order to raise 
revenue to cover the cost of administration, but more importantly, perhaps, in order to 
compel subsistence peasants to seek wage labor. Individuals unable to pay the head 
tax were forced to work as auxiliar (auxiliaries), some allocated to civil servants and 
traditional chiefs as domestic servants, others to the handful of companies, called 
"Sociedade," engaged in the cultivation and processing of coffee. Portuguese 
authorities apparently viewed labor, even if forced, as part of the civilizing process.
24 Luis Lobo da Costa, paper written for course on "Nationalism," June 2003.
25 Manuel Freitas, paper written for course on "Nationalism," June 2003.
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But there were dissenting voices. In 1909, the Portuguese journalist Antonio Padua 
Correia published a blistering attack against Jose Celestino da Silva, who had 
completed his long tenure as governor the previous year, with the sub-title "Highway 
Robbery, Assassinations, and Persecutions." The introduction to the 1911 Lisbon 
edition charges da Silva with "exercising slavery on his plantations by cunning means 
and maintaining, with the excuse of civilizing, harems [serralhos] in what he calls 
schools."26 Later the author writes:
The enormous plantation of Tatu-Bessi [Fatubessi, controlled by the massive 
Sociedade Agricultora Patria e Trabalho] needs a greatly enlarged personnel. To 
this farm Celestino I sent the prisoners of war, because war was made to steal 
and for Celestino to obtain slaves. There they lived, in perpetual servitude.
But as these hands weren't enough, Celestino ordered to muster up, from long 
distances, indigenous people. A "regulo" or chief was ordered to send two 
hundred or three hundred strong men to Tatu-Bessi. They worked in the 
plantations, carried the coffee and goods to the port of departure, Liquica, ten 
hours away by foot. For free, and regarding food . . . they had to eat the com 
cobs they brought from their lands! Note that the public works wore out the 
natives.. . .  A colonizer and administrator of brilliant capacity!27
Neither the Sociedade nor forced labor as modern slavery are themes in 
contemporary East Timorese politics. Nevertheless, the Portuguese use of forced labor 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contributed indirectly to the 
Fretilin ideology that developed in 1975. In particular, "Maubere," a common Mambai 
name, was taken by Fretilin leaders as a symbol of the nation. Most authors have 
argued that Maubere represents the poor, ignorant, downtrodden East Timorese 
peasant, analogous to Sukarno's Marhaen.28 But this figure may have a more precise 
political origin. Maubere (and his female counterpart, Bui Bere) first emerged as the 
Portuguese characterization of axuliar, or "asuliar," as it is used by people today.29 This 
origin sets Maubere apart from Marhaen: while the latter was created by Sukarno to 
represent the common peasant in Indonesia, the Portuguese term, Maubere, was 
appropriated and broadened by Fretilin to refer to the exploitation of all East 
Timorese.
Although forced labor is not a theme of current nationalist discussion in East 
Timor, older villagers (particularly in the western districts) readily discuss the 
"Sociedade" and their own former status as asuliar.30 Here Sociedade fills in for
26 Timor: O governo do general de brigada do quadro da reserva Jose Celestino da Silva durante 14 annos: 
Latrocinios, assassinatos e perseguigoes (Lisboa: 1911, second edition), p. 4.
27 Timor, p. 56.
28 See Helen Mary Hill, Gerakan Pembebasan Nasional Timor Lorosae (Dili: Yayasan Hak and Sahe Institute 
for Liberation, 2000), pp. 91-92.
29 During a discussion in Jakarta during the late 1990s, former Fretilin President Francisco Xavier do 
Amaral noted the link between asuliar and Maubere.I am grateful to Nugroho Katjasunkana for this 
information. It has not been possible to determine the date on which the discussion was held.
30 The younger, urban population is often unaware of the origin of the word axuliar, and many university 
students believe it to be an insult derived from the words asu, meaning "dog" in Tetun and Javanese, and 
liar, meaning "wild" in Indonesian. Further corrupting the spelling of the original term, one student argued 
that asulear meant "many dogs"!
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"master" and asuliar for slave. But as with liurai and atari, the pair of terms, 
Sociedade-asuliar, has become detached from the history of real slavery in Timor. Yet, 
as Padua Correia argued in his attack on Celestino da Silva, slavery continued 
throughout the heyday of the agricultural Sociedade. Similarly, according to Clarence- 
Smith "[c]hiefs, headmen, and leading warriors disposed of considerable numbers of 
slaves long after the export trade in slaves had been stopped, and it was only in the 
mid-1900s that the Portuguese made hesitant moves to abolish domestic slavery."31
Traitors and Nationalists
For the people of Portuguese Timor, the April 25, 1974 coup d'etat by the 
Movement of the Armed Forces in Lisbon finally opened the possibility of ending their 
"eternal slavery." In the following months, East Timorese were free to establish 
political parties for the first time. Among the tiny community of educated Portuguese, 
mestizos and assimilados, there was also an outpouring of artistic expression in which, 
not surprisingly, slavery was a prominent theme. In 1974, the poet Francisco Borja da 
Costa and Abilio Araujo, both of whom were members of the Timorese Association of 
Social Democrats (Associagao Social-Democrata Timorense, which in September 1974 
became Fretilin) wrote a song called "Foho Ramelau," the second stanza of which 
reads:
Why, Timor, is your head always bowed?
Why, Timor, are your children enslaved?
Why, Timor, are your children asleep like slaves?32
In another poem titled "The Maubere people will no longer be anybody's slave," Borja 
da Costa wrote:
We will shout with the greatest effort
For the people of Timor
For the Maubere people
So they will no longer become anyone's slave
No more
No more
No longer become anyone's slave.33
The same theme is central to a poem titled "Maubere" written by Jose Alexandre 
Gusmao in 1975. The fifth stanza reads:
MAUBERE People, 
clench your fist, 
shout out loud,
The hour is YOURS, MAUBERE!
31 W. G. Clarence-Smith, "Planters and Smallholders in Portuguese Timor in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries," Indonesian Circle, no. 57, March 1992, p. 19.
32 Francisco Borja da Costa and Abilio Araujo, "Foho Ramelau," in Helen Mary Hill, Gerakan Pembebasan 
Nasional Timor Lorosae (Dili: Yayasan HAK and Sahe Institute for Liberation, 2000), p. 93.
33 Translated from the Tetun by Janet Gunter.
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and your defiance will bring down 
the walls of your own enslavement!34
Butin August 1975, political tensions between the nascent East Timorese political 
parties led to a major permutation of the master-slave metaphor. On the night of 
August 10, 1975, members of the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) under the 
leadership of Joao Carrascalao sought to arrest members of the police who supported 
Fretilin, and the following day staged a coup d'etat. UDT made hundreds of arrests in 
Dili and smaller towns and conducted sweeps to confiscate Fretilin membership cards 
from the rural population. Two days after the UDT coup, the Fretilin Central 
Committee called for "a general armed insurrection against the traitors of the homeland 
and for the genuine liberation of the Maubere people."35 As fighting between Fretilin 
and UDT raged in Dili and several districts, the Portuguese governor General Lemos 
Pires fled to Atauro Island.
With the abdication of the colonial master, the central metaphor of politics shifted 
from masters and slaves to "traitors" and "nationalists." Interviewed in October 1975, 
Fretilin Central Committee member Nicolau dos Reis Lobato explained that "Fretilin is 
a broad front that unites all nationalists [and] anti-colonialists and therefore has the 
principal objective of liberating our people."36 At the same time, effigies of UDT 
leaders were hung from buildings in Dili and graffiti on bullet-pocked buildings read 
"Burn the traitors," and "Vigilance against traitors."37 Nevertheless, Fretilin leaders 
continued to recognize Portuguese sovereignty and demanded the establishment of an 
internationally recognized mechanism of decolonization. But in the face of increased 
covert Indonesian military operations in the western districts, Fretilin felt compelled to 
declare independence. On November 28 Francisco Xavier do Amaral read the one 
sentence-long declaration of independence, and the following day he was inaugurated 
as the first President of the new Democratic Republic of East Timor. In his inaugural 
address, Amaral explained:
Here are the reasons why the Maubere people take up arms to expel all 
mongers [vendilhoes] of our beloved Fatherland, all traitors to our liberty, all 
lackeys of imperialism and colonialism, all exploiters of our riches.
To deny the people of East Timor the right of independence is to deny them 
the right of liberty, and to transform them into eternal slaves.
To affirm that the people of East Timor never aspired for their total and 
complete independence is to negate purely and simply the history of a people.
The history of Portuguese colonialism in East Timor over four centuries is too 
dramatic for one to close one's eyes to incontestable facts.38
34 Xanana Gusmao, "Maubere," in To Resist is to Win, p. 35.
35 Gusmao, To Resist is to Win, p. 25. My emphasis.
36 Video footage of Portuguese journalist Adelino Gomes, October 1975.
37 Effigies are seen in video footage of journalist Adelino Gomes, October 1975; photographs of graffiti 
reading "Fogo aos traidores" and "Vigilancia contra os traidores" are in the Jill Jolliffe microfiche 
collection.
38 "Discurso do Presidente da Republica por Ocasiao da Investidura," in Timor-Leste: Uma Luta Herdica 
(Lisboa: no date or publisher [probably 1976]).
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Amaral's argument is constructed around "incontestable facts," among which are four 
hundred years of colonialism and, echoing the writing of Padua Correia, "eternal 
slavery." On top of the master-slave metaphor is layered the new pair, "traitor" and 
"nationalist." But the Republic was to be short-lived: nine days later Indonesia 
launched a massive, but poorly planned, invasion.
Fretilin put up staunch resistance, and for the next three years retained control over 
most of the territory. But under the strains of the Indonesian military onslaught, in 
1976-77 the pair "nationalist-traitor" was turned inward against people within 
Fretilin. Nationalists were replaced by "revolutionaries," traitors by "reactionaries." In 
late 1976, Fretilin began to arrest "traitors" within its own ranks. For example, Aquiles 
Freitas, a prominent military commander and son of the liurai of Letemumo, and 
several chiefs in the Viqueque region were arrested on charges of being "counter­
revolutionary" and "reactionary" and were eventually executed. In September 1977, 
Fretilin President Francisco Xavier do Amaral was arrested by the Fretilin Central 
Committee and tried for planning to negotiate with the Indonesian military, 
disregarding the struggle, and behaving in a "feudal" manner. He was convicted of
OQtreason.
For older East Timorese, the labels "traitor" and "nationalist," "reactionary" and 
"revolutionary" remain powerfully alive. By contrast, the generation schooled under 
Indonesia, most of whom were infants or had not yet been born in 1975, hold a 
radically different view of the 1970s. Most university students today believe that the 
"little people" were the victims of conniving political parties. One student, for 
example, wrote:
My family is from an ordinary background in society [masyarakat biasa] and 
wasn't involved in any kind of politics. But at the time of the civil war between 
several political parties in East Timor, as ordinary people [my family] didn't 
understand the goals of the political parties. Everyone fled to the forests because 
Falintil [Fretilin's military] told them to. [My family] didn't understand the 
meaning of ukun rasikan [self-sufficiency, a Fretilin theme]. But certain people 
spoke in the name of political interests [mengatasnamakan kepentingan politik] to 
obtain power. In general, the people of Timor Lorosae are not enemies with one 
another. But because of different political interests, the parties rose up against 
each other and the people, who were not at fault in any way, were the victims. 
The parties, which had political interests, were seeking support so that they 
could achieve their political goals.39 40
On the one hand, this analysis is an admirable effort to escape the black and white 
dichotomy between nationalists and traitors and create new historical space. On the 
other hand, this analysis unconsciously replicates Jakarta propaganda: that Indonesia 
was forced to invade East Timor in order to end the "civil war" and create stability for 
the ordinary East Timorese who were the victims of manipulative political leaders.
39 See Xanana Gusmao, To Resist is to Win, p. 49, and Fretilin, Relatdrio da Delegaqao do Comite Central da 
Fretilin, p. 30.
40 Martinho do Rego, paper written for course on Nationalism, June 2003.
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Pro-autonomy and Pro-independence
The Indonesian military onslaught of the late 1970s forced the surviving Fretilin 
leadership to reassess its strategy. Abandoning the base areas, Falintil slowly 
reorganized on the basis of smaller, more mobile units and developed clandestine 
networks linking Falintil with the population living under Indonesian control.41 "As the 
actual situation developed," writes Xanana Gusmao, "[we] came [to] the gradual 
understanding that, deep down, the true problem was the internal political problem 
which remained in our thinking and action."42 In early 1983, meetings between Xanana 
Gusmao and local Indonesian military commanders led to a temporary ceasefire. 
Gusmao also met with Governor Mario Carrascalao and appealed for a strategic 
alliance: "You take care o f the people, I'll take care o f Bapak-bapak [the Indonesian 
military]."43 Following advice from the Catholic church, in 1984, Fretilin jettisoned its 
Marxist ideology. And in December 1987, Gusmao declared that Falintil would be 
politically neutral and announced his own resignation from Fretilin. These moves were 
all aimed at broadening the resistance. In the words of Mario Carrascalao: "When 
Xanana said that he wasn't Fretilin, only the commander of Falintil, that's when the 
war started to be won. Apodeti (Associagao Popular Democratica de Timor, Timorese 
Popular Democratic Association) and UDT people who had been enemies of Fretilin 
could also join the movement."44
As seen in Xanana Gusmao's writings and autobiography, these moves led to new 
permutations of the master frames "traitor-nationalist" and "reactionary­
revolutionary. In a 1982 message to the United Nations General Assembly, Gusmao 
discussed "the incompetent Portuguese colonial government that collaborated with 
internal reaction" and "traitors of the nation."45 But in a 1987 letter outlining the 
"ideological turn-around," Gusmao speaks of Fretilin atrocities without the use of 
metaphor: "Since the beginning of 1976, the purging waves of massacres of nationalists 
[by Fretilin]—purgings that have continued since 1978—have placed many in a 
dilemma." Writing from Cipinang Prison in Jakarta in 1994, two years after his 
capture, he further distanced himself from the revolutionary language of the late 1970s, 
explaining that at the time he only understood the word "traitor," not "reactionary," 
and he placed quotation marks around the phrase "feudalist oldies" that he "swept 
away." By 1999, the word "traitors" had disappeared altogether, replaced by "our 
thorny civil war" and "problems of our early years in the mountains and the related 
acts of revenge." But Gusmao's shift is not simply a rejection of the revolutionary 
language of the late 1970s; instead it marks a return to the master-slave metaphor as 
he attempted to broaden the resistance to include people from all political 
backgrounds. But while Gusmao returned to the master-slave metaphor, the political 
opening for people from Apodeti and UDT backgrounds to "join the movement" led to 
the emergence of a new variation on this theme during the 1990s: "pro-independence"
41 Although information is sketchy, several informants have suggested that clandestine organizing first 
emerged among former slaves (atari) in the Viqueque district in 1980-1981.
42 Gusmao, "Ideological Turn-around," in To Resist is to Win, p. 132.
43 See the interview with Mario Carrascalao in this issue.
44 Ibid.
45 This and the following quotations in this paragraph, are all from Xanana Gusmao, To Resist is to Win, pp. 
75, 77, 134, 46, ix.
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became the new key word, particularly for East Timorese youth who came of age under 
the Indonesian occupation.
Suharto's resignation in May 1998 and President B. J. Habibie's offer in June of 
"broad autonomy" for East Timor marked a deepening of this new theme. In response 
to the upsurge in open political demands for independence during the second half of
1998, the Indonesian military and East Timorese collaborators stepped up militia 
organizing. In January 1999, President Habibie made the surprise announcement that he 
would recommend that East Timor be allowed to separate from Indonesia if the people 
so chose. Staunchly opposed to this decision, the Indonesian military stepped up 
militia organizing and direct military involvement to terrorize the population prior to 
the popular referendum. This campaign of terror cemented "pro-autonomy vs. pro­
independence" as the central frame that characterized East Timorese political thinking 
during 1999.
Despite the large body of research on the military-militia violence in East Timor in
1999, there is still no in-depth study on the social background and recruitment of 
militia members. Most accounts treat the militias as lackeys of Jakarta, either forced to 
join or bribed with counterfeit Rupiah, alcohol, and drugs. But there is good reason to 
think that such a portrayal is overly simplistic. In general, the militias were recruited 
from the lumpenproletariat—preman (thugs), gamblers, and the ever growing number of 
jobless migrants to the urban centers. In the course of community reconciliation 
processes in 2002-2003, a number of deponents have argued that they cannot simply 
discuss their involvement as militia members in 1999, but instead must begin with 
1975. They explain that during the late 1970s they had been "Fretilin" or even members 
of Falintil, but following their surrender they were forced to participate in paramilitary 
organizations or become informants for the Indonesian military. In other words, they 
are arguing that the phrase "militia member," used to tag an individual, is not 
necessarily synonymous with "pro-autonomy" or "traitor."
There are also indications that, at least in certain locations, militia recruitment was 
based on particular social backgrounds. In Lautem district, for example, where 
Fataluku speakers make up the only caste-based society in East Timor,46 interviews 
suggest that there was a tendency for militia members to be from the akanu (slave) 
caste. In some of the western districts, a different dynamic may have been at work.47 In 
Liquica district, which is dominated by large-scale coffee plantations, the Besi Merah 
Putih militia was recruited primarily from two locations. On the one hand, the District 
Administrator (Bupati) encouraged recruitment from his own hamlet, Caicasa, situated 
directly below the largest coffee plantation in the Maubara sub-district. There is strong 
reason to believe that most of militia members from Caicasa who terrorized the area 
are the descendants of plantation laborers (asuliar) from the late Portuguese period. 
The second site of militia recruitment was from the new kampungs surrounding the 
town of Liquica, many of the inhabitants of which are descendants of people who had 
previously been forced laborers on the coffee plantations in Liquica and the neighboring
46 Fataluku society is caste-based, meaning that members of different castes are not supposed to intermarry. 
Other ethnic/language groups in Timor have social hierarchies, but do not have strict rules about marriage.
47 The material in this and the following paragraph are based on numerous interviews in Lautem and 
Liquica in 2002-2003.
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Ermera district. Without land or social position in the surrounding communities, these 
asuliar drifted to the town of Liquica when their contracts expired, and there, during 
the Indonesian occupation, many of the younger men worked as market vendors, 
gamblers, thugs, and, of course, informers for the military. In both Lautem and Liquica, 
those at the bottom of the social scale may well have feared that independence would 
mean the reassertion of liurai or landlord power, and hence the revival of internal social 
stratification.
For East Timorese today, "pro-autonomy" and "pro-independence" parallel the 
master-slave metaphor. Pro-autonomy does not simply connote a political preference, 
but also an inferior relationship to a foreign master. And the term is not restricted to 
high-level collaborators and militia members. People in East Timor now often refer to 
the "pro-autonomy clinic" and the "pro-autonomy newspaper"! Pro-independence, of 
course, means freedom from colonial "slavery" and becoming "masters" of one's own 
future.
Opportunists and the Oppressed
From late 1999 until May 2002, East Timor was administered by the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which was mandated 
to reestablish order, maintain security, and prepare the territory for independence. 
Despite the large salaries paid to UN and international staff, the inefficiency and often 
unclear aims, most people were grateful for the UN presence and looked forward to a 
smooth transition to independence. Meanwhile, tensions between East Timorese 
heightened, in part because UNTAET carefully limited its interaction to a select elite, in 
part because of the problematic transformation of Falintil into the national defense 
force, and in part too because of the establishment of political parties and ensuing 
electoral competition.
However virulent were the East Timorese criticisms of UNTAET, their most 
damning criticisms were leveled against fellow East Timorese. In 2001-2002, young 
East Timorese activists could joke that they had achieved independence too soon, 
adding that they should have waited until the older generation had passed away. 
Similar sentiments were expressed in graffiti on walls in Dili: "Traitors are still 
traitors," and more recently, "Independent but not free." Criticisms of the new 
government came from both fhe left and the right. From the right (including people who 
had been pro-autonomy prior to the August 1999 referendum), the new government 
was criticized for seeking to establish a "leftist dictatorship" modeled on 
Mozambique. From the left there were criticisms that the government was allowing 
international monetary institutions to run the country. In July 2002, for example, the 
cover of the socialist publication Vanguarda read "Timor Leste in the handcuffs of 
imperialists," and a year later the journal Libertasaun ran a cover story titled "To free 
the people after obtaining a homeland."48
In July 2003, I asked the students in my class at the National University of East 
Timor what they thought about the current political situation. Their initial responses 
focused on political leaders (unresponsive), the performance of the government
48 See Vanguarda, "Timor Leste dalam borgol imperialis," vol. 1, July 2002, and Libertasaun,
"Memerdekakan rakyat setelah memperoleh tanah air," no. 2, July 2003.
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(unsatisfying), and party competition (unhealthy). When pressed to think about power 
relations more generally, the students unanimously concluded that society is divided 
between "opportunists and the oppressed" [oportunis dan kaum tertindas]. During the 
subsequent discussion, one student explained that opportunists are "people who 
didn't participate in the struggle [for independence] but immediately enjoy 
independence." He was quickly shouted down by a flurry of voices. "No," one student 
explained, "people who participated in the struggle are also opportunists—after 
winning [independence] they have received positions and want to force their will on 
others." This statement was greeted by widespread approval.49 A similar view is seen 
in the following opinion piece written a few days before independence and 
subsequently published in the Suara Timor Lorosae daily:
We did not obtain independence as a present that just fell from the sky or as a 
free gift from Indonesia, Portugal or the United Nations. Independence was 
achieved through the long struggle during 450 years against Portuguese 
colonialism and during twenty-four years of the Indonesian occupation. 
Independence is now within our grasp. [But] our leaders are now busy happily 
dividing power among themselves. Meanwhile the gap between them [national 
leaders] and the people is becoming wider.50
The divide between the powerful and powerless is also reflected in an apparently 
new usage of the word malae, which means "foreigner" in Tetun. This word has always 
been used to refer to foreigners (without indicating skin color or place of origin), but the 
expression malae boot, meaning "big foreigner," is now used to refer to East Timorese in 
positions of power. Something similar is at work with the distinction that some of my 
colleagues at the National University make between malae and hi tarn (black). In this 
instance, malae is intended to highlight the fact that many of the most-senior national 
leaders are mestizos or of wholly foreign descent (Arab and Goan), in opposition to 
darker-skinned East Timorese without foreign ancestry. Despite the apparently racist 
nature of the labels, this distinction is primarily intended to highlight social status and, 
of course, opportunity.
The pairs "opportunist-oppressed" and "foreign-black" (malae-hitam) are clearly 
permutations of the master-slave metaphor that is central to East Timorese political 
thinking. Both "opportunist" and "foreigner" stand-in for master, "oppressed" and 
"black" for slave, or more precisely perhaps those who are not yet free.
Conclusion
Over the past two years there have been repeated public statements about the 
importance of history in independent East Timor. In late 2002, for example, 
parliamentarian Leandro Isaac argued that "[t]he writing of history invites resistance 
from the people because what is written doesn't accord with the facts. Timor Leste is
49 Discussion on July 15, 2003. The statements: "orang yang tidak ikut perjuangan tapi bisa langsung 
menikmati kemerdekaan" and "orang yang berjuang juga termasuk oportunis—setelah menang dapat jabatan 
dan maksa kehendak terhadap pihak lain."
50 Rui Viana, "Mengakui para pejuang adalah menghargai sejarah (Refleksi dibalik acara dialog para 
mantan tahanan 'tragedi hotel Mahkota' di Aula Yayasan HAK)," dated May 16, 2002, published in Suara 
Timor Lorosae, June 6, 2002.
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now an independent and sovereign state, so history has to be written truthfully so as 
not to create problems in the future."51 Similarly, while visiting a site where UDT 
supporters murdered twelve members of the Fretilin affiliated Timorese Student Union 
in 1975, Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri explained: "We will not be embarrassed by the 
dark history of our past. As the backbone of the struggle for independence, Fretilin will 
not be afraid to reveal the true historical facts. If in the past mistakes were made, 
Fretilin will say so because independence was won by the people of East Timor with 
blood and tears." These are admirable sentiments with which many would agree.
The problem, however, is the framework within which historical debates are 
conducted and the uses to which they are put. For regardless of the period in question, 
when East Timorese gaze back across their long and often tragic history, they do so 
through a highly dichotomous lens. Despite the permutations—liurai and atari, 
Sociedade and asuliar, traitors and nationalists, reactionaries and revolutionaries, pro­
autonomy and pro-independence, opportunists and the oppressed—the master-slave 
metaphor remains central to how East Timorese understand their history. And this 
dichotomous view is projected forward to politics today. Yet at the same time, East 
Timorese continue to conjure up the spirits of the 1975 resistance to the Indonesian 
invasion. In an October 2002 interview, for example, Mario Carrascalao commented:
Never again format or shape the people of East Timor as happened in 1975, 
when [they] wanted everything to be Marxist. That's already obsolete, and 
contradicts the East Timorese political paradigm. People prefer democracy now 
and want to create a democratic atmosphere . . . .  I know that President Xanana 
[Gusmao], in his entire soul, heart and mind, is a true democrat. Compassion is 
the dominant value in his politics. And Xanana's performance is not his political 
specialty alone, but it is the performance of the entire people of East Timor. The 
people truly understand what freedom is, what independence means, what 
oppression means.52
For many East Timorese, democracy is not simply a matter of political rules and 
procedures, political ideologies and party programs, official positions (including 
salaries, vehicles, foreign travel, and so forth) and opportunities to skim from state 
coffers. Instead, for many people (particularly those outside Dili), democracy is 
understood in terms of who "determines" history and who must remain silent.
51 "Leandro" Jangan manipulasi sejarah," Suara Timor Lorosae, December 3,2002. [Q: Should there be single 
quotes around "Leandro?"
52 "Wawancara khusus dengan Mario Carrascalao [sic] (1): Rakyat jangan dikembalikan ke tahun 1975," 
Suara Timor Lorosae, October 21, 2002.

